Integrity Support Message Architecture Design for Advanced Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring by Martini, Ilaria et al.
Integrity Support Message Architecture Design
for Advanced Receiver Autonomous Integrity
Monitoring
Ilaria Martini, Markus Rippl and Michael Meurer
German Aerospace Center (DLR), Munich, Gemanny
email: Ilaria.Martini@dlr.de,
Markus.Rippl@dlr.de,
Michael.Meurer@dlr.de
Abstract—In the near future of multiconstellation and
multifrequency GNSS signals, the users will experience
a significantly increased accuracy, thanks to the larger
number of satellites in view and to the ionosphere free
observations. Integrity, continuity and availability require-
ments will mainly drive the system performance. In this
scenario Advanced Receiver Autonomous Integrity Moni-
toring (ARAIM) has attracted significant interest, since it
can provide aviation users with worldwide vertical guid-
ance.
This paper aims to contribute to the on-going discus-
sion on the ARAIM design analyzing the critical problems
and proposing recommendations for an Integrity Support
Message (ISM) architecture satisfying the aviation integrity
risk requirement and at the same time maximizing avail-
ability and continuity.
Several alternatives for different integrity risk allocation
to the satellite, the GNSS ground, the ISM ground and
the user are discussed. In particular three contributions
are provided: an alternative approach for the overbound-
ing method used to compute the integrity information,
a ground monitoring algorithm for the estimation of the
Integrity Support Message (ISM) and an ISM content design
containing information in the satellite domain (along-track,
cross-track and radial) rather than in the range domain.
The improvement in terms of integrity, availability and
continuity are shown by means of simulations results. In
particular the reduction of conservatism of the proposed
solution is presented.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The design of the Integrity Support Message (ISM) Ar-
chitecture enabling the fulfilment of the aviation precision
approach requirements for a standalone GNSS receiver
with Advanced Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
techniques is an interesting and challenging topic. This
paper aims to contribute to the discussion providing
guideline and recommendations for the optimum design.
This introduction describes the context and identifies the
problems addressed by the approach proposed in the
second section.
First of all a short description of the background is
provided. In particular the ICAO aviation integrity re-
quirements, the ISM architecture design drivers and the
present Advanced RAIM concept, are recalled. Secondly
the problem of the error overbounding method, which
imposes strict GNSS design requirements, is discussed.
Finally the user point of view is analyzed with respect
to its need of relaxing requirements and simplifying the
receiver algorithms.
A. Context
1) Integrity Requirements for aviation users
The objective of the ARAIM concept is to provide
the aviation users with vertical guidance up to preci-
sion approach based on multiconstellation GNSS signals.
Navigation systems supporting vertical guidance of air-
crafts are subject to several requirements governing their
performance. The requirements are standardized through
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The
target operation levels are LPV, LPV-200 and beyond,
which are specified in the ICAO Standards And Recom-
mended Practices SARPs [1], as follows:
• fault-free accuracy 4m at 95% and 10m at 10−7,
• faulty-case accuracy 15m at 10−5,
• integrity risk 2 · 10−7 per approach.
These represent the most strict requirements for
GNSS applications at the present. They refer to small
percentiles (10−7) and to short operation intervals (ap-
proach duration of 150s), on which the user must be
alerted within 6s when a failure condition occurs.
2) Advanced RAIM and ISM concept
The ARAIM concept was proposed within the U.S.
GPS Evolutionary Architecture Study report [2]. Further
evolution has been provided by the Working Group C
ARAIM Technical Subgroup Interim Report [4]. The pro-
posed receiver algorithm is based on the Multiple Hypoth-
esis Solution Separation method described by [13].
To clarify the notation used in the rest of the paper,
the ISM definition is briefly recalled (for details refer to [4]
and [13])
The ISM contains two sets of parameters, one to
describe overbounding distributions for integrity purpose
and another to describe nominal performance for con-
tinuity purpose. The content in particular refers to the
User Range Accuracy (URA) for GPS and to the Signal
In Space Accuracy (SISA) for Galileo, both contained in
the corresponding navigation message1. These values
represent the standard deviations of the distribution over-
bounding the satellite orbit and clock errors, i.e. the Signal
In Space Error (SISE). In particular the ISM for the ith
satellite contains:
• αi: scaling factor for the URAi(SISAi) to cover
the integrity requirements,
• βi: scaling factor for the URAi(SISAi) to cover
the continuity requirements,
• Bimax: the maximum bias value of SISE to cover
the integrity requirements,
1In case of GNSS system other than GPS and Galileo analogous
values for URA(SISA), characterizing the satellite orbit and clock
errors, should be considered
• Binom: the nominal bias value of SISE to cover the
continuity requirements,
• P isat: probability of single satellite fault.
Beside for each constellation, the ISM contains the term
Pconst, i.e. the probability of constellation wide fault.
3) ISM Architecture Design Drivers
The new concept of ISM/ARAIM represents an in-
teresting possibility to meet the strict LPV integrity re-
quirements. At present the architecture design is an open
topic, containing several alternatives still to be screened.
Many aspects influence and determine the optimum
design: liability constrains of the Aviation Navigation
Service Providers (ANSP) and GNSS Providers, politic
agreement among states and certification-standardization
authorities, economic aspects related to the need to reuse
as much as possible existing infrastructure, etc. This
paper will focus only on the technical aspects. The aim
is to contribute to the ongoing discussion, providing a
methodology to address the main performance drivers
and identifying guidelines and recommendations for the
design.
The main ISM Architecture design drivers are the
followings:
• the monitoring network in charge of collecting the
observables used to compute the ISM content.
Its coverage might be global (e.g. GNSS sen-
sor stations network or even an Inter Satellite
Link monitoring network), regional (e.g. SBAS
like network) or local (e.g. GBAS like monitoring
stations),
• the dissemination network in charge of sending
the ISM to the final user. Its coverage might also
be global (e.g. GNSS constellation or internet
connection), regional (GNSS constellation trans-
mitting regional information, or subset of a GNSS
constellation, e.g. orbiting only on a specific re-
gion, GEO satellites) or local (VHF data link like
VHF Data Brodcasting link of GBAS),
• the ISM latency, i.e. ”the time it takes for the
ground network to identify an issue in the space
segment and alert the aircraft to that issue” [4].
Not all the combinations of the previous alternatives
are feasible. Most of them do not provide the desired
performance. The following sections analyze and identify
technical constrains and guidelines for the optimization.
B. Relax GNSS architecture design requirements related
to the error overbounding
One of the most critical issues of the GNSS integrity
monitoring is estimating position error bounds covering
small percentiles. The challenge is finding the best trade-
off between inflating the bound to be sufficiently safe and
reach the required confidence level (i.e. 10−7) without
degrading excessively the continuity and availability. This
problem is faced by the user and above all by the ground
segment when trying to provide integrity information to
the user: either the GNSS ground monitoring in comput-
ing URA(SISA) but also any other independent ground
monitoring. A previous design of the Galileo integrity
service showed in the past that the costs in terms of
ground segment complexity are significant and should be
carefully taken into account.
The idea at the present is that a third party can take
part of the integrity risk. This could be the role of the
independent ISM architecture. Through the provision of
an additional integrity message, it could relax contem-
poraneously GNSS ground segment and user receiver
requirements.
On the other side, it is important to have a clear and
a common understanding of the most critical aspects,
because the ISM architecture will need to address and
solve the same problems of the GNSS ground monitoring.
This section focuses in particular on the problems related
to the overbounding method.
1) Overbounding concept
In many situations, the range error is difficult to be
modeled a priori (i.e. in case of strong multipath, when
only the non line of sight signal can be received and no
a priori information can be used). But many stochastic
errors are result of a combination of a large number of
effects. For the central limit theorem the resultant statistic
is Gaussian distributed. For this reason the overbounding
is based on the Gaussian distribution model.
Another reason is that this distribution model simplifies
the processing since the Gaussianity is conserved in
linear transformations: if the ranging errors satisfy the
overbounding in the range domain, the resultant position
error will be Gaussian distributed with an overbounding
standard deviation given by the covariance propagation
method. This is guaranteed thanks to the linearity of the
geometry transformation projecting the errors from the
range to the user domain.
The overbounding concept allows deriving a conser-
vative characterization of the position error from conser-
vative models of the range error distributions.
Different definitions of Gaussian overbounding have
been proposed in the past. ICAO defines the overbound-
ing concept in [1] as follows:
If ∫ +∞
y
g1(x)dx ≤
∫ +∞
y
g2(x)dx ∀y ≥ 0
and ∫ y
−∞
g1(x)dx ≤
∫ y
−∞
g2(x)dx ∀y ≤ 0
g2(x) ∼ N(0, σ) is a Gaussian distribution overbound-
ing g1(x).
The ICAO concept, like the cumulative density function
overbounding concept proposed by DeCleene in 2000 [6],
is based on the assumption of zero-mean, symmetric, and
unimodal distributions.
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Figure 1: Symmetric overbounding concept. The sum of the left and
right tails of the overbounding distribution exceeds that of the target
distribution.
It might be interesting, as discussed for Galileo, trying
to remove the symmetry assumption considering the sum
of the tails, as shown in Figure 1, with the following
definition:
If ∫ y
−y
g2(x)dx ≤
∫ y
−y
g1(x)dx ∀y ≥ 0
g2(x) ∼ N(0, σ) is a Gaussian distribution overbound-
ing g1(x).
But in an equivalent way to [6], zero-mean and uni-
modality are required.
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Figure 2: Statistic distribution of the vertical position error due to satellite
orbit and clock at the worst user location, that is the maximum value of
the signal in space error on the satellite visibility area.This distribution is
generated in case of instantaneous SISE monitoring where each epoch
the SISE for the worst user location is considered. The probability of
SISE WUL being close to zero is also close to zero, in fact for any SISE
vector its maximum projection in the range domain is always different
from zero.
The zero-mean assumption represents a strong limita-
tion, in fact, as the experience with WAAS suggests, small
biases are always present and cannot be removed (e.g.
antenna biases, signal distortions, etc.): the presence of
biases must be then included in the range measurements
model [2].
Besides also the unimodality and symmetry assump-
tions are restrictive: in fact the ground monitoring must
conservatively protect the worst user location error, that
is the maximum projection of the range error within the
satellite footprint. This operation generates asymmetric
and multimodal distributions like the one displayed in
Figure 2, as described by [8].
Other concepts, proposed by [9], [10], [11], [12]
overcome the mentioned limitations, because they allow
asymmetry, multiple modes, and non-zero means. But
these methods introduce a significant conservatism and
generate large bound values which degrade continuity
performance, as described in [15].
This is complicated by the fact that unfortunately
the true error distributions are not known. The ground
monitoring can only estimate them from a set of sample
data. And the sample size is mostly significantly small to
reach the 10−7 integrity risk confidence level.
For example a global network of 30 sensor stations
needs at least 3 years to collect 108 samples at 1Hz
from a constellation of 27 satellites. Instead considering
an optimistic correlation time of 1 minute and a limited
network coverage, more than 10 years are needed!
The lack of historic data is a problem not only for
new GNSS systems, like Galileo, but also for existing
systems, like GPS and WAAS, which are going to face a
modernization period with new signals, new satellites and
new error models (e.g. multipath error with dual frequency
observations).
Furthermore the certification of the GNSS ground
segment is characterized by stringent safety standards
(DAL Level B). They impose even stricter requirements
on the error bound estimation, which must be extremely
accurate in particular during the verification phase.
In conclusion, the high confidence level required by
the requirements, the lack of historic data and the conser-
vatism of the overbounding methodologies are problems
to be addressed for the definition of the ISM integrity
concept, as it is described in the next.
2) Integrity Risk Allocation
This section describes the integrity risk allocation
(for the notations refer to [1] and [14]) and presents in
particular the role of the different systems involved: GNSS
ground segment, ISM ground segment and user receiver
algorithm (ARAIM). The scope is to analyze the impact
of the overbounding risk on the integrity risk probability.
The overall integrity risk, that is the probability of
having an Hazardous Misleading Information without an
alarm being issued in time, is indicated with PHMI . It
has three main contributions: the fault free probability,
PFFHMI , the narrow failure probability in case of failure
affecting independently each satellite 2, PNFHMI , and the
wide failure probability in case of simultaneous correlated
satellite failures, PWFHMI [4].
2Independent failures can affect more satellites simultaneously.
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Figure 3: Integrity Risk Allocation Tree
Different threats are identified accordingly to the kind
of failure they can generate (narrow or wide). Figure
3 shows an example of integrity risk tree, where only
some threats are shown (satellite clock, satellite signal
distortion, etc.). The threats (wide failures) that affect the
whole constellation (i.e. earth rotation parameter failure
[4]) are characterized by the constellation failure proba-
bility, Pconst.
The overall integrity risk is given by the sum of the
three contributions:
PHMI = P
FF
HMI + P
NF
HMI + P
WF
HMI . (1)
For the sake of simplicity in the next sections the focus
of this analysis will be on the satellite failure probability,
Psat, i.e. on the PNF . As described in [14], each integrity
risk final node contains the product of the failure occur-
rence probability POC , the missed detection probability
PMD and the failure impact on the vertical and horizontal
position error IV,H :
PHMI = POCPMDIV,H (2)
The probability of occurrence POC depends on the
number of failing satellites f and on the total number of
satellites N . POC follows a binomial distribution:
POC(f,N) =
(
N
f
)
(1 − Psat)N−fP fsat (3)
Figure 4 shows that the occurrence probability of the
multiple failure is smaller than twice the double failure
one:
POC(f ≥ 2, N) =
N∑
f=2
POC(f,N) ≤ 2POC(2, N) (4)
Then the following upper bound for the integrity risk
can be considered
PHMI ≤ PFFHMI + PNSFHMI + 2PNDFHMI (5)
with PNDFHMI = POC(2, N).
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Figure 4: Comparison of occurrence probabilities between multiple
satellite failure and double satellite failure case: POC(f ≥ 2, N) ≥
2POC(2, N). A Psat = 10−6 was used for the simulation. An analogous
behavior is observed also for all Psat ∈ [10−4, 10−7].
Regarding PMD, it is observed that in the fault free
case no failure has to be detected, that is PFFMD = 1.
Besides for the failure cases the worst case is consid-
ered where no failure detection is performed at receiver
level, i.e. PNSFMD = PNDFMD = 1 and all failure conditions
generate HMI events on the user position, i.e. IV,H = 1.
This is a conservative approach, which has the scope to
highlight and isolate the impact of the Psat value on the
integrity risk in the worst case.
It results
PFFHMI = (1 − Psat)NIV,H (6)
PNSFHMI = N(1− Psat)N−1Psat (7)
PNDFHMI =
N(N − 1)
2
(1− Psat)N−2P 2sat (8)
Since Psat  1, Taylor series approximations for
PNSFHMI and PNDFHMI can be used, obtaining
PNSFHMI  NPsat + o(P 2sat) (9)
PNDFHMI 
N(N − 1)
2
P 2sat + o(P
3
sat) (10)
Finally, in the worst case conditions
PHMI ≤ (1−Psat)N IV,H+NPsat+N(N−1)P 2sat+o(P 2sat)(11)
The resulting integrity risk allocation tree is shown in
Figure 5.
The integrity risk in the narrow failure case is propor-
tional to NPsat and is the most critical one. In fact to
have a PHMI smaller than the 10−7 value specified by
the integrity risk requirement, Psat must be in the same
order of magnitude.
Since Psat is given by the contributions of the different
threats, the design must identify for each threat with
POCIV,H > 10
−7 a barrier with a sufficiently small PMD.
Whereas for most of the threats finding a barrier and
tuning the relative PMD might be not critical, the risk
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Figure 5: Satellite failure probability impact on the integrity Risk Allo-
cation Tree. For the sake of simplicity the different threat contributions
are not reported in the figure.
related to the overbounding remains problematic for all
the intrinsic limitations described in the previous section.
This paper focuses on reducing the impact of this
risk through the ISM independent architecture, allowing
an effective relaxation of the GNSS ground monitoring
design requirements.
C. Relax receiver design requirements related to Time To
Alarm performance
The integrity risk requirements are expressed in terms
of tail probability area. The user actually needs that each
instantaneous position error does not generate an HMI
event. Unfortunately the stochastic processes are not
stationary and any outlier must be monitored.
The detection of high dynamic error has been up to
now allocated to RAIM Fault Detection and Exclusion
techniques. For precision approach operations, their per-
formances need to meet TTA and continuity requirements
on short operation durations (150s). If ISM could monitor
also high dynamic error, the user requirement could be
significantly relaxed, reducing in particular the receiver
algorithm complexity.
More in details, the ISM design is based on the
following parameters:
• TIA (Time to ISM Alarm): interval between the
ISM reception time at the user receiver and the
time of failure occurrence,
• Tobs: duration of the interval on which the ISM
ground segment collects observations to compute
the ISM content,
• Tdiss: duration of the interval between the ISM
transmission time and the ISM reception time at
the user receiver. The ISM computation duration
is included in this term and can be considered
negligible.
• URISM : update rate of the ISM content
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Figure 6: Relationship between TIA, Tobs and Tdiss
Figure 6 shows the relationship between TIA, Tobs
and Tdiss.
It is observed that TIAmax = Tobs + Tdiss. Besides
if no overlapping observation intervals are considered,
as shown in the figure, URISM = 1Tobs . Actually, as it
is discussed in the next, to monitor almost stationary
process and slow changing errors it is suggested to
consider overlapping intervals (long term monitoring).
Depending on the value of URISM , two types of
monitoring can be identified as extreme cases. Then the
final ISM could be any solution in between as well as a
combination of both.
1) Long term monitoring
If ISM aims to monitor only the fault free nominal
conditions (overbounding) or slow dynamic error for the
faulty case, the ISM does not need to have a high update
rate. In this case the ISM content must be a prediction
of the error bound on the future before the next ISM is
received. This means that the ISM ground monitoring can
only monitor almost stationary processes and/or detect
small drifting errors, which might generate in the next
interval an HMI event for the user.
ISM reception by user
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Figure 7: Long term monitoring: relationship between TIA versus TTA.
In this case the ISM refers to the future
Figure 7 shows the meaning of the ISM, that is a
prediction on the future interval and its relationship with
TTA.
2) Short term monitoring
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Figure 8: Short term monitoring: relationship between TIA versus TTA.
In this case the ISM refers to the past (if TIA < TTA)
If ISM aims to address high dynamic failures, it could
be interpreted as a bound on the past 6s, as displayed
in Figure 8.
The ISM design requirements are in this case
• TIA < TTA,
• Tdiss  TTA,
• URISM > 1/TTA.
In this hypothetic extreme case the ISM must be
updated at least every 6s and above all the dissemination
delay must be significantly smaller than the TTA. This
second approach has the advantage to protect the user
against large instantaneous failure, which must be oth-
erwise detected by the user. This approach relaxes and
simplify the user integrity monitoring at receiver level.
On the other side the ARAIM concept is based on
the independence of the integrity service from the ground
monitoring. The possibility to provide a shorter term mon-
itoring introduced in this paper refers to a short latency
however bigger than the 6s, e.g. in the order of minutes.
A Fault detection and exclusion algorithm must be used
in any case by the user, because ISM would cover only
the satellite and constellation failures. But the missed
detection requirements for the receiver algorithm would
be relaxed.
II. ISM GROUND MONITORING ALGORITHMS
This section contains the description of the ISM data
content and the ISM ground monitoring algorithm able to
overcome the problems described in the previous section.
The ISM computation algorithm is divided in two parts.
The first one is a long term monitoring aiming to
cover the fault free integrity risk. It assesses the validity
of the GNSS nominal performances represented by the
URA(SISA) values. In case these values do not perform
a correct overbounding, inflation factors are estimated
and sent to the user through the ISM. This part impacts on
the ISM architecture design in particular on the monitoring
network. In fact its coverage must enable to reach the
required confidence level by collecting a sufficient amount
of data.
The second part is a short term monitoring aiming to
cover the faulty case integrity risk. This part strongly de-
pends on the ISM update rate and consequently impacts
on the ISM architecture, i.e. on the dissemination network
coverage.
A. ISM content and format
The bandwidth available to transmit the integrity infor-
mation might be limited, as in the case of the URA(SISA)
information sent through the GNSS navigation message.
Although the satellite orbit and clock error (SISE) can
be estimated by the GNSS ground segment as vector
of three components (along-track, cross-track and radial
[8]), the integrity information sent to the user through the
navigation message, URA(SISA), contains scalar values
bounding the errors in the range domain.
The bounding in the range domain is more conserva-
tive than that in the satellite domain. In fact, since any
user in the satellite visibility area has to be protected, the
integrity bounds are inflated to protect an hypothetic user
in the worst location. This might degrade significantly the
continuity and availability, as it shown in the result section.
This paper suggests to send the vectors of values
bounding the errors in the satellite domain (along-track,
cross-track and radial) rather than the scalar ones in the
range domain. The projection in the range domain is then
performed by the user itself. This approach better fits
with the real user performance. Beside all the involved
algorithm transformations are linear and the Gaussian
statistic properties are conserved after the convolution:
the multimodal distribution effect, shown in Figure 2, is
not present anymore. The achievable improvements are
shown in the result section.
The integrity concept proposed in this paper defines
the following ISM data content for the ith satellite:
• αi: vector of scaling factors for the standard de-
viation of the along-track, cross-track and radial
satellite orbit and clock error components,
• Binom: vector of mean values of the along-track,
cross-track and radial satellite orbit and clock
error components,
• Bimax: vector of maximum values of along-track,
cross-track and radial satellite orbit and clock
error components.
• P isat: probability of single satellite fault
For the whole constellation, Pconst, i.e. the probability of
constellation wide fault is contained in the ISM.
Table 1 compares the ISM parameters baseline ([4])
and the one proposed in this paper. The proposed ISM
content differs from the [4] for the following aspects:
Table 1: ISM content baseline versus the proposed one
ISM baseline ISM proposal
αi : scaling factor for the
URAi/SISAi to cover the integrity
requirements
αi : vector of scaling factors for the
standard deviation of the along-track,
cross-track and radial satellite orbit
and clock error components
βi: scaling factor for the
URAi/SISAi to cover the
continuity requirements
-
- Bi
max
: vector of maximum values
of along-track, cross-track and radial
satellite orbit and clock error compo-
nents
Binom: the nominal bias value of
SISE to cover the integrity require-
ments
Bi
nom
: vector of mean values of
the along-track, cross-track and ra-
dial satellite orbit and clock error
components
P isat: probability of single satellite
fault
P isat: probability of single satellite
fault
Pconst: probability of constellation
fault
Pconst: Probability of constellation
wide fault
• the information are vectors of three components
instead of scalars (except the satellite and con-
stellation failure probability, which are scalars in
both cases),
• the term βi is not included in the proposed ISM. In
case the ARAIM MHSS algorithm uses a distinc-
tion between continuity and integrity parameters
[4], a constant factor between αi and βi can
be used, as proposed in the GEAS report [2]:
βi = 0.5αi,
• the Bimax term contains information on the er-
ror upper bound instead of the error distribution
mean value. This allows a more effective failure
detection and integrity risk reduction, as explained
hereinafter,
• the Binom term contains the mean values of the
SISE components, whose confidence level ad-
dresses the integrity performance and not the
continuity ones.
Table 2: ISM latency
Parameter Monitoring type Latency
αi long weeks
Bi
nom
long weeks
Psat long months
Pconst long months
Bi
max
short seconds or minutes
Table 3: ISM maximum data rate at 0.2 Hz
Parameter Number of bits Data rate in bps
αi 5760 1152
Binom 5760 1152
Bi
max
5760 1152
Psat 1920 384
Pconst 64 13
Total ISM 25024 5005
The ISM is constituted of two parts: the αi, Binom,
P isat and Pconst estimated by the long term monitoring,
which can and should have a long latency and the Bimax
estimated by the short term monitoring, which should
have a short latency, as shown in Table 2. This short
latency content must not necessarily be updated every
6s. The proposed approach can be applied also with a
smaller update rate. Each region and ASNP can decide
independently and provide different services to the user.
The intent is to provide the user also with a shorter
latency monitoring, which enables on one side the es-
timation of slow dynamic threats and on the other the
estimation of the real satellite and constellation perfor-
mance. In fact the integrity model of URA(SISA) is too
conservative and more realistic parameters, like URE or
those provided by a short term monitoring, are needed
by the user.
Table 3 shows an estimation of the maximum ISM
data rate reached if hypothetically an ISM latency smaller
than 6s is used to transmit all the parameters (update
rate 0.2 Hz)3. This estimation is provided to assess in a
worst case of a single dissemination link the maximum
bandwidth needed. The maximum data rate would be
circa 5 Kbps, which can fit in a local dissemination link
like the GBAS VHF Data Link (maximum datarate is 31
Kbits/s [3]). In case of a global dissemination a satellite
link can sustain such a bit rate.
B. Long term integrity monitoring
The long term monitoring must
• verify whether the URA(SISA) navigation mes-
sage information perform the overbounding and if
necessary to compute the relative inflation factors
αi,
• assess the nominal bias of the signal in space
error, Binom,
• eventually, estimate and adjust the Psat and Pconst
values specified by the GNSS providers.
Regarding the first point, the estimation of the stan-
dard deviation, σ, overbounding a certain distribution, is
usually performed estimating the sample standard de-
viation and taking the upper limit of the corresponding
confidence level. In particular an unbiased estimator,
used when the sample size is very large, is the standard
deviation of the sample, denoted by SN and defined as
follows:
SN =
√√√√ 1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(xi − x)2
where {x1, x2, ..., xN} are the observed values of the
sample items and x is the sample mean value of these
observations, while the denominator N stands for the
sample size.
3A constellation of 30 satellites and 1 double for each parameter were
assumed
Since (N−1)S
2
N
σ2 follows a chi square distribution with
N − 1 degrees of freedom, the following can be stated
P
(
(N − 1)S2N
σ2
≤ χ2N−1,1−CL
)
= 1− CL
where CL is the confidence level. Equivalently
P
(
S
√
N − 1
χ2N−1,1−CL
≤ σ
)
= 1− CL
The value
√
N−1
χ2
N−1,1−CL
is taken as inflation factor αi
for the standard deviation of the distribution overbounding
the true one.
This paper proposes another method, called quantile
method and described hereafter. The improvement in
terms of reduced inflation factors is presented in the result
section.
1) Overbounding risk as threat
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Figure 9: The sample size N used to assess a certain empirical
distribution identifies a maximum interval [−y, y] for which the over-
bounding can be estimated. Only the following assertion can be done:
P (|xi| < y) = 1− G. Outside the interval, the lack of information and
the degraded test accuracy don’t allow to perform any assessment.
As described in the first section, the ground moni-
toring, both the GNSS than the ISM one, has a limited
sample size available to assess the small percentiles of
the nominal distribution. Overbounding can be estimated
only for a certain maximum percentile, depending on the
sample size N . If the maximum percentile which can be
assessed with enough accuracy is indicated with G, it can
be argued only that with probability 1−G, the sample xi
belongs to the central area of the Gaussian distribution
characterized by the URA(SISA). As shown in Figure 9,
only the following assertion can be done:
P (|xi| < y) = 1−G
On the tails of smaller percentiles, no assertion can
be done, since not enough information is available.
This has an impact on the satellite failure probabil-
ity, Psat. In fact this value is the result of all possible
failure probabilities. It is based on design requirements,
assessed by the GNSS provider and verified by the ISM
system provider. The overbounding risk, that is the risk
that the xi belongs to the tails, should be defined as threat
and be included in the Psat probability, as follows
Psat =
Nthreats∑
j=0
P jthreat +G
This approach allows avoiding the use of overbound-
ing methodologies which introduce conservative inflation
factors, degrading significantly the continuity and avail-
ability performance and based in any case on unveri-
fiable assumptions. And at the same time, it can sig-
nificantly relax the ground segment requirements, which
does not need anymore to guarantee bounding till small
percentiles.
2) Quantile Methodology
The methodology proposed to assess this long term
statistic is based on an hypothesis testing approach using
quantile estimation. The algorithm takes also into account
the estimation accuracy related to the limited sample size.
The objective is to assess whether the URA(SISA)
value performs the overbounding of the SISE distribu-
tion. This is done observing the empirical distribution of
the SISE estimations.
The following notation is used: SISE is the scalar
value containing the satellite orbit and clock error in the
range domain and SISE is the vector containing the
same error in the satellite domain (i.e. long-track, across-
track and radial components)4.
The computation of the empirical distribution is based
on the samples collected on a certain long batch. The
overbounding of the URA(SISA) is assessed with an
hypothesis testing methodology estimating the quantiles.
This method allows to take a margin to control the risk
of erroneous failure of the assessment (the ground mon-
itoring assessment is wrong due to statistical uncertainty
although overbounding in terms of probability indeed
was given). This is important above all when sample
distribution are generated with small sample size.
The samples are generated by the ground monitoring
by assessing the satellite orbit and clock failure error
vector, SISE. In particular several GSS observations are
collected by in the ground segment, pre-processed, cor-
rected for the network synchronization error, and finally
a least square estimation based on the GNSS residuals
is performed [8]. The algorithm considers separately the
three components of the estimated SISE and for each
of them verifies the overbounding.
URA(SISA) performs the overbounding of the true
distribution for any boundary y if the following conditions
are satisfied 5
Gl(y) ≤ Gl(y)∀y ≥ 0 (12)
4The satellite clock is modeled in the radial component in order to
reduce the number of unknowns and take advantage of the redundancy.
5The ICAO overbounding definition is considered as reference [1]
and
Gr(y) ≤ Gr(y)∀y ≥ 0 (13)
where the left and right tail weights of the real distribution
with probability density function g(x) are
Gl(y) =
∫ −y
−∞
g(x)dx (14)
Gr(y) =
∫ ∞
y
g(x)dx (15)
and the left and right tail weight of the nominal distribution
with probability density function g(x) are
Gl(y) =
∫ −y
−∞
g(x)dx (16)
Gr(y) =
∫ ∞
y
g(x)dx (17)
with g = N(0,URA(SISA)).
The probabilities Gl and Gr cannot be exactly de-
termined. They can be estimated by determining the
frequency of samples that are respectively less than y
and greater than +y:
Gˆl(y) =
nl,y
N
(18)
and
Gˆr(y) =
nr,y
N
(19)
where nl,y is the number of samples xj with xj < −y,
nr,y is the number of samples xj with xj > y and N total
number of samples. To simplify the algorithm, the SISE
samples xj are normalized with respect the URA(SISA)
values to be verified. With this normalization the tail areas
can be compared directly with standard normal tails.
This estimation is repeated for different y values and
performed separately for each error component6.
The method considers separately the verification of
the left and right tail and then combine the inflation factors
taking the maximum of both. Hereafter the algorithm for
the left tail, for one percentile and one error component
is explained.
An hypothesis test method is used, defining the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
H0 : Gl(y) ≤ Gl(y)
H1 : Gl(y) > Gl(y)
(20)
The important assumption is taken that the observed
samples are mutually uncorrelated. The correlation time
is assumed known ”a priori”, provided by the GNSS
system provider or estimated during a preliminary ground
6Since URA(SISA) refers to the norm of the SISE vector, a
scaling factor (1/√3) should be included in the normalization. But the
URA(SISA) values bound the vector projection and not the vector
norm. Then for safety reason the scaling factor is not included. Never-
theless for algorithm tuning, this aspect should be taken into account
and eventually the scaling factor included.
monitoring initialization phase. The correlation time must
be taken into account for the sampling rate.
The number of tail samples nl,y follows a binomial
distribution:
P (nl,y = x) =
(
N
x
)
(1− p)N−xpx, (21)
where p = Gl(y).
In order to guarantee a certain α-risk, that is the
probability of erroneously rejecting the H0 hypothesis, the
threshold xT for this binomial distribution is computed for
which
P (nl,y > xT ) ≤ α (22)
where
P (nl,y > xT ) = 1−
xT∑
n=0
(
N
n
)
(1− p)N−npn (23)
and p = Gl(y).
The corresponding threshold for the sample frequency
is given by
pl,T (y) = xT /N (24)
It is observed that with this test threshold, for any
value of Gl for which Gl(y) < Gl(y), the probability of
erroneously rejecting H0 is smaller than the α-risk, as
shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Hypothesis Testing Threshold
The overbounding is verified, if for each considered
boundary y the observed frequency of samples bigger
than y is less or equal to the corresponding threshold.
Gˆl(y) ≤ pT (y) (25)
In case the overbounding test is not passed, an in-
flation factor Kl(y) is computed. In particular for each y,
the minimum inflation factor Kl(y) is found, for which the
number of samples nKl,y, for which xiKl(y) ≤ y satisfies
GˆKl (y) =
nKl,y
N
= pT (y) (26)
Afterwards the maximum is taken among different y
Kl = max
y
Kl(y) (27)
and between the left and right tail inflation factors:
K = max(Kl,Kr) (28)
Table 4: Hypothesis Test Thresholds and minimum detectable tail with
N = 1000, α = 10−3 and β = 10−2
y Standard Tail
G(y)
Left/Right Tail Thresh-
old pT (y)
Minimum Detectable
Tail GMD(y)
0.5 0.3085 0.3540 0.3902
1.0 0.1586 0.1950 0.2258
1.5 0.0668 0.0920 0.1154
2.0 0.0227 0.0390 0.0556
2.5 0.0062 0.0150 0.0265
3.0 0.0013 0.0060 0.0145
3.5 0.0002 0.0030 0.0100
The overbounding test thresholds, given a certain α-
risk, are computed offline and a lookup table is used to
perform the test. An example is provided in Table 4.
The algorithm is performed and repeated separately
for each satellite and error component and provides the
values of αi, that is the estimated K factors.
It is possible to characterize the test accuracy ob-
serving the algorithm resolution shown in Table 4. In fact
given a certain hypothesis test threshold, a β-risk can
be defined and the relative minimum detectable tail area
identified. GMD is the minimum value of G > G for which
the probability of erroneously deciding for H0 is smaller
than β-risk.
The difference
GMD −G
G
represents the relative test resolution and provides a
measurement of the algorithm accuracy for which the
missed detection capability is guaranteed.
3) Algorithm
The long term ISM ground monitoring aims checking
whether URA(SISA) performs the overbounding and if
not, it computes inflation factors for URA(SISA) and
send them to the user through the ISM. The algorithm
outputs are the αi vector for each satellite, given as input
the samples of the estimated SISE components and
the URA(SISA) navigation message information. The
algorithm steps, for satellite i and each error component,
SISEj of the SISE vector, are the following:
1) For each y value in the Table 4,
a) Compute the N samples
xt =
SISEj,t
σ
with σ = URA for GPS, σ = SISA for
Galileo satellite and t = 1...N ,
b) Compute the relative frequency
Gˆl(y) =
nl
N
where nl is the number of samples xt for
which xt < −y,
c) Compare the relative frequency Gˆl(y)
with pl,T corresponding to current y con-
tained in Table 4,
d) If Gˆl(y) > pl,T , find iteratively the mini-
mum Kl(y) value for which
GˆKl (y) =
nKl
N
≤ pl,T
where nKl is the number of samples xt
for which xtKl(y) < −y,
e) If Gˆl(y) ≤ pl,T , set Kl(y) = 1,
2) Compute the Kl = max
y
Kl(y),
3) Compute the inflation factor Kr for the right
distribution tail analogously to the left tail one,
Kl,
4) Compute αi,j = max(Kl,Kr).
Besides, the mean value of each SISE component
and for each satellite is assessed as follows
Bnom,j =
1
N
∣∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
j=0
SISEj
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
tc,N−1σ√
N
where σ = αi,jURA for GPS and σ = αi,jSISA for
Galileo and tc,N−1 is the percentile value of a t-Student
distribution with N − 1 degrees of freedom relative to the
confidence level c. The confidence level is derived by
the maximum y value verifiable with the available sample
size, N .
Finally the Psat and Pconst can be verified. In partic-
ular these probabilities can be assessed evaluating the
relative frequency of respectively the satellite and constel-
lation failures on the whole available data history. These
estimations are compared with the values specified by the
GNSS providers and/or eventually conservatively updated
through the ISM.
It is in any case suggested to use for Psat and Pconst,
the values specified by the GNSS providers. Their estima-
tion at ISM should be discarded due to the no stationarity
of the processes involved and to the long observation
period required to reach a significant confident estimation.
C. Short term integrity monitoring
The possibility to introduce also a short term mon-
itoring has the scope to characterize more closely the
constellation and satellite performance and cover part of
the integrity risk for the faulty case. This is performed
by computing the error parameters, Bimax, which contain
upper bounds of the signal in space errors.
[2] and [4] indicate that the Bimax values represent a
conservative estimation (maximum) of the mean values
of the SISE distribution.
This paper proposes to use this term in order to
cover high dynamic failures and relax the receiver FDE
requirements. To cover the failure condition, the Bimax
value should provide information on the tail area, more
than on the mean value [5]. This is done by fixing a priori a
certain risk probability γ and observing each satellite error
component, SISEj , on a certain interval. The SISEj
upper limit, Bmax,j , is then computed, in order to have
P (
∣∣SISEij∣∣ ≥ Bimax,j) ≤ γ
To relax the user requirements for the instantaneous
failure detection, the short term monitoring should ideally
be updated at least every 6s (TTA). In this way the ISM
ground monitoring could compute the maximum value of
the SISE on intervals of 6s. This value is then inflated
to take into account the ground estimation accuracy pro-
vided by the inverse diluition of precision and the sensor
stations range noise. The obtained value would represent
the Bimax value. But this approach would represent a
SBAS-like integrity service. And for ARAIM it is intended
to have an ISM latency bigger than the TTA.
With TIA > TTA (or TIA 	 TTA), the ISM ground
monitoring can still detect slow dynamic errors, i.e. small
drifting errors. For a given short term TIA, the specific er-
ror dynamic detectable by the ISM short term monitoring
must be identified. The ISM short term monitoring can
address only the identified errors characterized by the a
priori model. To this purpose, it can estimate the error
drift corresponding to the model, predict the error on the
future interval and detect possible HMI event. The Bimax is
then a prediction with confidence level γ of the maximum
error during the next operation interval. This covers only
the errors with the dynamic identified a priori. It does not
exclude the occurrence of big outliers generated by higher
dynamic errors.
In this case the integrity risk allocation must distin-
guish between slow dynamic and high dynamic threats
and identify separately the detection strategy. With TIA >
TTA, part of the detection of high dynamic failures must
be allocated to the user ARAIM algorithm.
The short term monitoring should be in charge also
to flag a satellite as unhealthy (by setting for example
the Bimax parameters to invalid value, e.g. -1) in case of
large and persistent errors. The user can then discard the
satellites declared unhealthy by the ISM ground monitor-
ing.
Since Bimax contains the three vector components,
the unhealthy flag should be set independently for each
of them, allowing a selection strategy at receiver level,
depending on the specific geometry and requirement. For
example a user interested only on lateral guidance (e.g.
a ship or an aircraft not in a final approach phase, etc.)
might in any case want to use satellites at zenith with
radial SISE component flagged as unhealthy.
D. User algorithm
The user algorithm which mostly suits the short la-
tency approach is similar to the integrity risk algorithms,
proposed by Oehler [7] and that proposed by Mach [5] for
Galileo. The most important advantage of this concept is
that the integrity risk allocation is not fixed among vertical
and horizontal components, as in [4]. The user does not
compute a protection level, but calculates directly the
integrity risk at alert limit level ([7]).
But the proposed algorithm has the following important
differences:
• for the fault free mode the signal in space er-
ror distribution to be considered is not a zero
mean Gaussian distribution with standard devi-
ation URA(SISA), N(0, URA(SISA)), but three
biased Gaussian distributions for the along-track,
cross-track and radial signal in space error
with inflated standard deviations N(Binom,j , αij ·
URA(SISA)),
• for the faulty mode the signal in space error must
be considered bounded by Bimax,j with a risk
probability γ ([5]),
• multiple failures are included in case the oc-
currence failure probability is not negligible with
respect to the integrity risk.
The user estimates the overall integrity risk by adding
several contributions, from fault free to single and multiple
failure cases. Each contribution is given by the tail area
delimited by the alert limit. Each faulty case should be
included only if the relative probability of occurrence POC
is not negligible with respect to the integrity risk.
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Figure 11: User integrity algorithm: vertical position error distributions
for the integrity risk user algorithm.
Figure 11 shows the vertical position error distributions
considered for the integrity risk computation. In the plot
only the fault free case and the narrow single faulty
case are displayed. The user algorithm considers also,
if needed, the multiple failure case.
Before starting with the integrity risk computation,
the user has to project the signal in space vectorial
information (α, Bnom and Bmax) into the range domain
(α, Bnom and Bmax).
The vertical position error distribution is a Gaus-
sian distribution, whose mean value μFF and the
standard deviation σFF are obtained considering for
all range errors the fault free Gaussian distribution
N(Bnom,
√
ασ2sv + σ
2
tropo + σ
2
user), with σsv = URA for
GPS and σsv = SISA for Galileo. Estimation models of
the tropospheric and receiver local error, i.e. σtropo and
σuser , are provided in [4].
The faulty case mean value μNF and the stan-
dard deviation σNF are obtained considering for
all fault-free range errors the Gaussian distribution
N(Bnom,
√
ασ2sv + σ
2
tropo + σ
2
user) and for the faulty range
error the distribution N(Bmax,
√
σ2tropo + σ
2
user). In fact
the satellite orbit and clock error contributions are already
contained in the inflation of Bmax,j and its corresponding
risk probability γ.
The fault and detection exclusion algorithm based on
the solution separation method proposed by the MHSS
algorithm [4] must be used in both cases to have the
necessary failure detection capability at receiver level.
III. RESULTS
This section presents the performance of the pro-
posed integrity concept and the ISM processing algo-
rithms by means of Monte Carlo simulations.
A. ISM content in the satellite domain
If ISM contains vectors bounding the single error
components instead of scalars, integrity, continuity and
availability performance are improved. This section shows
the improvement in term of reduction of the ISM param-
eters.
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Figure 12: Signal In Spacer Error vector projected within the satellite
footprint. The worst user location (WUL) and the best one (BUL) are
identified. In the figure r = 6371km, R = 26600km and α = 13.86.
The user masking angle is assumed zero.
Different Signal In Space Errors, E in Figure 12,
have been generated and their projections in the satellite
visibility area have been analyzed. In particular the ratio
between the minimum and the maximum projections has
been observed. The goal is estimating the degradation
experienced by a user located in the best user position
when applying the error of the worst user location. Figure
12 shows the geometry of the problem.
Figure 13 shows the ratio between the minimum and
the maximum projection for different angles β,
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Figure 13: Ratio between the maximum and the minimum SISE
projection in the satellite visibility area versus the angle β.
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and Figure 14 the relative cumulative density his-
togram. Both plots show that there are many cases,
where a user located in the best position can experience
an inflation factor bigger than twice the one he would
actually need to meet the integrity risk requirements. In
particular in 35% of the cases the minimum error can
be smaller than half the maximum and in 60% of the
cases smaller than 1.5 the maximum. These factors are
proportionally degrading the protection level. Sending the
integrity information in the satellite domain, allows to re-
move the conservatism of the worst user location concept
and improve continuity and availability performance.
B. Quantile method with respect to sample standard
deviation method
This section shows the performance of the quantile
method described in the second section with respect to
the sample standard deviation method.
Figure 15 shows, for a specific value of G = 10−4, α
and β risk, the quantile method accuracy, i.e.
GMD −G
G
Increasing the sample size N with respect to tail per-
centile G, the method accuracy increase and the mini-
mum detectable tail gets closer to the nominal one, as it
is shown in Figure 16.
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Figure 15: Estimation accuracy of the quantile method based on
hypothesis testing. In this case G = 10−4 and N = 104
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Figure 16: Quantile method estimation accuracy versus NG
In particular it is shown that to have a relative accuracy
of 0.5 at least 100
G
samples are required. This represents a
general rule of thumb for the minimum number of samples
needed to have acceptable long term monitoring accu-
racy. Usually it is commonly assumed that the minimum
sample size needed to estimate a tail area G is N = 1G .
But actually a factor 100 is needed (N = 100G ) to have a
sufficient estimation accuracy, as shown in Figure 16.
Figure 17 and Figure 18 shows that the quantile
method provides a smaller inflation factor overall (except
for percentiles smaller than 0.5 which are not relevant for
integrity purpose). For y = 2 the inflation factor of the
sample standard deviation method is even twice that of
the quantile method.
C. Upper bound instead of mean value for the short term
monitoring
This section describes the comparison between the
vertical protection levels computed with the MHSS ap-
proach proposed in [4] with that proposed in this paper
with a short latency ISM.7.
The following parameters were used:
• PHMI = 2 · 10−7,
• user grid masking angle 5
7The new user algorithm would foresee an estimation of the integrity
risk instead of the protection level. In order to compare the two
algorithms the protection level approach was used for the new user
algorithm.
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Figure 17: Comparison of sample standard deviation method versus
the quantile method in terms of inflation factors of URA(SISA). For
the sake of simplicity for the overbounding the sum of the left and right
tails are displayed in the results, although the quantile method foresees
the verification separately of the left and right tails.
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Figure 18: Ratio between the inflation factor of the sample standard
deviation method and that of the quantile method
• Psat = 10−5,
• 24 GPS and 24 Galileo satellites8,
• γ = 10−2 for the short term monitoring risk
(KISM = 2.5),
• SISE ∼ N(0.1m, 0.5m),
• standard deviation of the sensor station measure-
ment noise (Gaussian distributed): 0.5m,
• URE = 0.5m for GPS and URE = 0.67m for
Galileo,
• URA = 0.75m for GPS and URA = 0.957m for
Galileo,
• Bnom = 0.1m for GPS and Bnom = 0.1m for
Galileo,
• Bmax = 0.75m for GPS and Bmax = 0.75m for
Galileo.
Figure 19, Figure 20 and Figure 21 show the compar-
ison between the protection level computed with the tra-
ditional MHSS approach and that proposed in this paper.
8A smaller-than-nominal constellation was chosen to allow for better
visibility of the performance difference between the algorithms.
Figure 19: Comparison of MHSS versus New Protection Level
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Figure 20: Probability Density Function of the ratio between the MHSS
Protection Level and the New one
The user algorithm proposed by the paper improves the
availability and continuity by providing smaller protection
levels.
The results depends on the simulation scenario used
and in particular on the risk allocated to the long and
to the short term monitoring and on the ISM ground
monitoring geometry. In the specific simulation scenario,
80% of the cases present a smaller protection level if
computed with the new approach.
Figure 22 and Figure 23 show also the improvement
of the proposed approach in terms of availability map.
D. ISM Architecture comparison
This section describes how the integrity risk is shared
among the different systems involved (GNSS, ISM and
user). In particular shows the impact of the proposed
integrity concept and methods on the integrity risk tree.
The overall tree is illustrated in Figure 24.
First of all, the result of the combination of GNSS and
ISM long term monitoring on the failure occurrence proba-
bility Psat is analyzed. It is observed that the ISM should
perform a verification of the GNSS information with an
independent methodology. It should not repeat the same
satellite orbit and clock error estimation performed by the
GNSS ground segment, otherwise there is no effective
risk reduction. In fact the goal of the ISM monitoring is
to generate a probability PMD multiplying the POC . This
requires an independent method, aiming to verify rather
than to repeat the process.
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Figure 21: Cumulative Density Function of the ratio between the MHSS
Protection Level and the New one
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Figure 22: MHSS availability map
For example the sample standard deviation method
performs an overbounding estimation analogous to the
GNSS ground monitoring estimation. The two corre-
sponding risks cannot be multiplied, in fact the GNSS
and the ISM observes two representations of the same
stochastic process.
That is why the proposed quantile method has a differ-
ent purpose: it verifies the validity of the GNSS estimation
with an independent method. To perform that, it fixes
a priori a false alarm probability (α-risk), and a missed
detection probability (β-risk). These values are then used
to compute the satellite failure probability resulting from
the combination of GNSS and ISM monitoring.
For the overbounding methodology defined in the
previous section, given a certain sample size N only a
maximum percentile y corresponding to the tail area G
can be verified. The relationship between GGNSS and
GISM depends on the corresponding sample size.
If NISM ≥ NGNSS, the ISM ground monitoring can
verify with enough accuracy the maximum percentile
yGNSS referred by URA(SISA). In this case the over-
bounding risk of the inflated URA (or SISA) is given by
GGNSSβISM where βISM is the hypothesis testing β risk
of the long term monitoring.
It is important for the quantile method to have enough
accuracy and tune properly the different risk probabilities.
In fact, as displayed in Figure 15, for all the tail areas
between G and GMD the missed detection probability (β
risk) cannot be guaranteed. It is then important to keep
this interval sufficiently small. A rigorous mathematical
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Figure 23: New approach availability map
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Figure 24: Integrity risk allocation tree with ISM integrity monitoring
approach would require to consider for each tail area
in between the corresponding missed detection value,
defining the function of the missed detection probability
versus the threat magnitude, as proposed in [14]. To keep
the approach simple, it is suggested to tune the algorithm
parameters and define a small interval GMD −G/G (e.g.
0.05). Then the corresponding β risk value can be used
in the integrity tree, as shown in Figure 24.
In case instead NISM ≤ NGNSS, the maximum ISM
percentile is smaller than the GNSS one: yISM ≤ yGNSS.
The conclusion is that
GGNSS+ISM ∼= max(GGNSS , GISM )βISM
From this relationship, it can be concluded that the
ISM long term monitoring leads to an appreciable integrity
risk reduction if GISM ≤ GGNSS , i.e. if the ISM sample
size is larger than the GNSS one. The realization of this
might face feasibility problems.
The short term monitoring however has a different
effect. In fact the γ risk, defined in the short term monitor-
ing, directly multiplies the GGNSS+ISM risk and the risk
reduction can be more effective.
In both cases it is shown how the real added value
in terms of risk reduction results by ISM ground monitor-
ing methods which verify the GNSS performance more
than repeat an analogous monitoring. This leads to risk
probability reduction through probability multiplication.
IV. CONCLUSION
The design of an ISM architecture enabling the fulfill-
ment of the ICAO precision approach requirements with
a stand alone GNSS receiver is an interesting topic, while
its details are challenging due to ambitious goals.
First of all the overbounding methodology has to meet
the integrity risk requirements expressed in terms of
small probabilities with a limited amount of data. Several
methods have been investigated in the past, but they have
strict assumptions and are extremely conservative.
This paper uses a different approach. It fixes the over-
bounding risk as the maximum tail area estimable with the
available sample size, defining it as threat and modelling it
in the satellite failure probability Psat. This allows to relax
the GNSS ground monitoring design requirements and
consequently the number of needed sensor and uplink
stations.
Besides it proposes two ISM ground monitoring algo-
rithms: a long term monitoring covering the fault free case
using a quantile method based on an hypothesis testing
approach. This method improves continuity and avail-
ability through reduced ISM inflation factors with respect
to usual sample standard deviation method. Secondly a
short term monitoring is proposed, where the maximum
Signal In Space errors rather than conservative mean
values are estimated. This additional monitoring allows
to relax the receiver design requirements and to have
simple user algorithms. Finally a different ISM content
with respect to the present definition is proposed. The
combination of these proposals improve the continuity
and availability performances providing reduced protec-
tion levels.
The overall study provides guidelines and recommen-
dations for an optimum ISM architecture design, in order
to have an efficient and effective integrity risk reduction
both for the GNSS ground segment and for the user.
The best ISM performance can be reached if the ISM
long term monitoring system uses a longer observation
interval than the GNSS ground segment. This might
be unfeasible due to the lack of historic data. On the
other side the short term monitoring can also provide
an effective and significant risk reduction. The paper
provides methodologies to quantify the ISM monitoring
performance and compute the architecture design param-
eters.
A potential improvement of the system performance
with respect to present algorithms is demonstrated by
means of Monte Carlo simulations. The validation of this
activity with real data is ongoing. In particular a global
monitoring network of around 15 stations, available at
DLR (EVnet and Congo), will be used to characterize
GNSS constellation threats, estimate ISM and investigate
ARAIM algorithms. The user ARAIM algorithm perfor-
mance will be then finally verified during a flight cam-
paign.
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